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PREFERENCE AGGREGATION, COLLECTIVE CHOICE
AND GENERALIZED BINARY CONSTITUTIONS1
Nicolas-Gabriel ANDJIGA, Joe¨l MOULEN2,
re´sume´ – Agre´gation des pre´fe´rences, choix collectif et constitution ge´ne´ralise´e binaire
Ce papier, intitule´ agre´gation des pre´fe´rences, choix collectif et constitutions ge´ne´ralise´es binaires,
a pour objectif l’e´tude de la notion de constitution ge´ne´ralise´e binaire (CGB), distribution de
pouvoirs de´finie par Ferejohn et Fishburn [1979] qui ge´ne´ralise les notions de jeux simples et de
jeux de vote. Une CGB permet de de´finir une proce´dure d’agre´gation des pre´fe´rences (PAP) et
nous caracte´risons les CGB pour lesquelles les PAP associe´es conduisent a` des pre´fe´rences collec-
tives qui sont toujours soit comple`tes, soit asyme´triques, soit transitives soit acycliques lorsque les
pre´fe´rences individuelles sont des pre´ordres ou des ordres totaux. Les PAP associe´es a` des CGB
e´tant e´quivalentes aux proce´dures d’agre´gation des pre´fe´rences ve´rifiant l’inde´pendance vis-a`-vis
des alternatives exte´rieures, nous faisons un tour d’horizon de quelques re´sultats arrowiens. Sous
les meˆmes hypothe`ses de pre´fe´rences individuelles, nous caracte´risons les CGB dont le coeur est
non vide et obtenons les re´sultats classiques dont le the´ore`me de Nakamura sur les jeux simples.
mots cle´s – Coeur, Constitution ge´ne´ralise´e binaire, Inde´pendance vis-a`-vis des options
exte´rieures, Jeu simple, Proce´dure d’agre´gation des pre´fe´rences
summary – The aim of this paper is to study the notion of Generalized Binary Constitution
(GBC), a distribution of power due to Ferejohn and Fishburn [1979], which generalizes some
classical notions such as simple games and voting games. The GBC helps us to define a preference
aggregation rule (PAR) and we characterize GBC’s whose collective preferences are either complete,
asymmetric, transitive or acyclic when individual preferences are weak orders or linear orders.
Since the procedure of aggregation of preferences which satisfies IIA is equivalent to the preference
aggregation rule of a GBC, we give relations between our results and some Arrovian results. We also
characterize core-stable GBC’s and therefore deduce classical results and in particular Nakamura’s
theorem for simple games.
keywords – Core, General binary constitution, Independence of irrelevant alternatives,
Preference agregation rule, Simple game
1. INTRODUCTION
Many results of social choice theory show that when a preference aggregation rule
satisfies certain axioms, then its underlying power structure also satisfies particular
properties and in particular it can be dictatorial or oligarchic. Since Arrow, the
1Article rec¸u le 07 janvier 2003, re´vise´ le 07 mai 2003, accepte´ le 05 juin 2003.
2CREAM, Universite´ de Yaounde´ I, Cameroun, andjiga2002@yahoo.fr, joel-moulen@yahoo.fr
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relation between the distribution of decision power over individuals and the proper-
ties of a preference aggregation rule is an important stream of social choice theory.
This paper is devoted to study the notion of generalized binary constitution (GBC),
a notion which generalizes the notion of binary constitution due to Ferejohn and
Fishburn [1979]. The best introduction to this notion is their following remark:
“A common notion of decisive coalition is a subset of individuals such that when they
unanimously prefer one alternative to another, then the first is socially preferred to
the second... The point we wish to stress on is that no conception of decisive coalition
that characterizes decisiveness in terms of simple subsets of individuals, even if it is
made to depend explicitly on pairs of alternatives, is adequate to characterize certain
interesting aggregation procedures. An example of this is the simple majority aggre-
gation procedure, in which x is socially preferred to y if and only if more individuals
prefer x to y than y to x. In this case every coalition that contains more than half of
the individuals is decisive, but what about other coalitions? For example, a non empty
coalition is “decisive” when all other individuals are indifferent but is not generally
decisive... Our proposal to remedy the deficiencies noted above is very simple and
perhaps obvious by now. It is to characterize decisiveness structures by ordered pairs
of disjoint coalitions rather than by single coalitions”.
The GBC is, then a structure of distribution of power which generalizes some
classical notions: the relative majority rule, simple games and voting games (Naka-
mura [1979], Andjiga and Mbih [2000]), the decisive GBC’s (called binary game
in constitutional form in Andjiga and Moulen [1989]) and the binary constitutions
(BC) (Ferejohn and Fishburn (1979]). The notion of GBC is therefore an appropri-
ate framework to unify various structures and various results of social choice theory.
We will divide our paper into two major parts:
a) the study of a GBC as defining a preference aggregation rule (PAR) through
the notion of dominance in section 1;
b) the study of a GBC as defining a collective choice rule (CCR) through the
notion of core in section 2.
Let us recall that with a given profile of individual preferences, a PAR associates
a collective binary relation whereas a CCR associates a subset of alternatives.
In section 1, we assume that individual preferences are either weak orders or
linear orders. The first significant result is the equivalence between the PAR of a
GBC and a PAR which satisfies (the Arrovian) independence of irrelevant alterna-
tives (IIA) axiom. For each domain of individual preferences, we give necessary and
sufficient conditions for the dominance of a GBC (and thus for others, particular
structures) to be either complete, antisymmetric, transitive or acyclic. Each of these
results can be seen as a focus on the (degree of complexity of the) power of decision
which underlines each of these properties on collective preference. Let us point out
that few new results in general are obtained in section 1. Most of them were already
obtained in Ferejohn and Fishburn [1979] and in Aleskerov and Vladimirov [1986].
We will not be interested in obtaining the Arrow theorem again (this has been done
by Monjardet, [2003]). Furthermore, the relations between acyclic PAR’s, and the
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existence of vetoers and oligarchies are very well discussed in Moulin [1985], Le Bre-
ton and Truchon [1995] and Banks [1995]. The notions of cycles of a GBC will be
used to link up the two sections.
Section 2 is devoted to the study of the core-stability of a GBC. From the main
theorem, we deduce classical results obtained on simple games (Nakamura, [1979]),
voting games (Andjiga and Mbih, [2000]) and decisive GBC’s (Andjiga and Moulen,
[1989]; Truchon, [1995]).
2. NOTATIONS AND DEFINITIONS
Let N be the finite set of players and A the finite set of alternatives.
If R is a binary relation on A, R is
• transitive if ∀x, y, z ∈ A, xRy and yRz =⇒ xRz,
• reflexive if ∀x ∈ A, xRx,
• irreflexive if ∀x ∈ A, not (xRx),
• complete if ∀x, y ∈ A, x 6= y =⇒ xRy or yRx,
• strongly complete if ∀x, y ∈ A, xRy or yRx,
• antisymmetric if ∀x, y ∈ A, xRy and yRx =⇒ x = y,
• asymmetric if ∀x, y ∈ A, xRy =⇒ not ( yRx),
• negatively transitive if ∀x, y, z ∈ A, zRx =⇒ yRx or zRy.
(a1, a2, · · · , am) is a cycle of order m of R if: ∀k = 1, ...,m, akRak+1 where
am+1 = a1.
One point on which papers in social choice theory differ is the nature of individual
preferences. For some authors (as Arrow, [1963]), individual preference relations are
complete while others (as Ferejohn and Fishburn, [1979]) assume that individual
preference relations are asymmetric (and so irreflexive).
Let us compare these two formalizations of the individual preferences:
If R is a binary relation, the asymmetric component of R is the (asymmet-
ric) binary relation P defined by: ∀x, y ∈ A, xPy ⇔ xRy and not(yRx) and its
symmetric component is the (symmetric) binary relation I defined by: ∀x, y ∈
A, xIy ⇔ xRy and yRx. Since P and R are disjoint relations, we will write
R = P + I. When R is a complete relation, one has xPy ⇔ not(yRx).
Conversely if Q is an asymmetric relation, we define a (complete) relation R as
follows: ∀x, y ∈ A, xRy ⇔ not(yQx).
Observe that Q is the asymmetric component of R.
We will give the usual definitions on individual preferences first of all, in the
irreflexive and asymmetric version, and then in the complete version.
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DEFINITION 1. a) R is a strict linear order if R is asymmetric, complete and
transitive.
b) R is a strict weak order if R is asymmetric, negatively transitive and tran-
sitive.
c) R is a strict partial order if R is asymmetric and transitive.
d) R is acyclic if R is a relation without cycles.
Let us note that since an irreflexive and transitive relation is asymmetric, a) b)
and c) of the above definition can therefore be stated with irreflexivity instead of
asymmetry. Furthermore, R has no cycle of order 2 if and only if R is asymmetric.
DEFINITION 2. a) R is a linear order if R is antisymmetric, strongly complete
and transitive (or R is strongly complete and its asymmetric component is a strict
linear order).
b) R is a weak order if R is strongly complete and transitive (or R is strongly
complete and its asymmetric component is a strict weak order).
Let us remark that in general each author denominates notions in definition 1
and 2. Our choice of names is therefore personal, for example our notion of strict
weak order is called asymmetric weak order by Ferejohn and Fishburn [1979].
We denote by:
• B (resp. BN) the set of binary relations on A (resp. the set of profiles of
binary relations on A);
• C (resp. CN) the set of complete binary relations on A (resp. the set of profiles
of complete binary relations on A);
• H (resp. HN) the set of complete and asymmetric binary relations on A (resp.
the set of profiles of complete and asymmetric binary relations on A);
• L∗ (resp. L∗N) the set of strict linear orders on A (resp. the set of profiles of
strict linear orders on A);
• W∗ (resp. W∗N) the set of strict weak orders on A (resp. the set of profiles of
strict weak orders on A);
• L (resp. LN) the set of linear orders on A (resp. the set of profiles of linear
orders on A);
• W (resp. WN) the set of weak orders on A (resp. the set of profiles of weak
orders on A);
• P (K) (resp. 2K) the set of subsets (resp. non empty subsets) of K;
• |K| the cardinality of a finite set K;
• A= {(x, y) ∈ A× A/x 6= y} ;
• N = {(S, T ) ∈ P (N)× P (N)/S ∩ T = ∅} .
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If RN and QN are profiles of binary relations and {x, y} a pair of A, we denote
by:
• RN(x, y) ⊆ QN(x, y) if : ∀i ∈ N , xRiy ⇒ xQiy,
• RN(x, y) = QN(x, y) if : ∀i ∈ N , xRiy ⇐⇒ xQiy,
• RN{x, y} = QN{x, y} if : RN(x, y) = QN(x, y) and RN(y, x) = QN(y, x),
• N(x, y, RN) = {i ∈ N/xP iy} and π(x, y, RN) =
(
N(x, y, RN), N(y, x,RN)
)
.
Let us first define various distributions of power:
DEFINITION 3. a) A generalized binary constitution (GBC) is a mapping
∆ from A to N .
b) ∆ is
i) complete if: ∀(x, y) ∈ A,∀(S, T ) ∈ N , (S, T ) ∈ ∆(x, y) or (T, S) ∈ ∆(y, x),
ii) asymmetric if: ∀(x, y) ∈ A,∀(S, T ) ∈ N , (S, T ) ∈ ∆(x, y) =⇒ (T, S) /∈
∆(y, x),
iii) decisive if: ∀(x, y) ∈ A,∀(S, T ) ∈ N ,∀U ⊆ N, (S, T ) ∈ ∆(x, y) and
(S, U) ∈ N =⇒ (S, U) ∈ ∆(x, y),
iv) neutral if: there exists U ⊆ N ,∀(x, y) ∈ A,∆(x, y) = U ,
v) monotonic if : ∀(x, y) ∈ A,∀(S, T ), (U, V ) ∈ N , (S, T ) ∈ ∆(x, y), S ⊆ U
and V ⊆ T =⇒ (U, V ) ∈ ∆(x, y),
vi) Paretian if: ∀(x, y) ∈ A, (N, ∅) ∈ ∆(x, y).
We can notice that these previous notions on a GBC are pairwise independent.
But ∆ is Paretian if ∆ is monotonic and ∀(x, y) ∈ A,∆(x, y) 6= ∅.
Let ∆ be a GBC, (x, y) ∈ A and (S, T ) ∈ N . Intuitively (S, T ) ∈ ∆(x, y) means
that x is socially preferred to y when the set of individuals who prefer x to y is S
and the set of individuals who prefer y to x is T .
If ∆ is a decisive GBC, (S, T ) ∈ ∆(x, y) means that x is socially preferred to y
when the set of individuals who prefer x to y is S (without any condition on the
other individual preferences).
DEFINITION 4. A GBC is called
i) a binary constitution (BC) if it is asymmetric,
ii) a voting game if it is decisive and neutral,
iii) a simple game if it is a monotonic voting game.
If ∆ is decisive, for every (x, y) ∈ A, ∆(x, y) depends only on a family F(x, y) of
coalitions ofN (empty or not) which verifies: F(x, y) = {S ⊆ N/∃T ⊆ N, (S, T ) ∈ ∆(x, y)} .
A decisive GBC is therefore an application from A to P (N).
If ∆ is a voting game (i.e. decisive and neutral) this family is the same for each
(x, y) in A and ∆ is a simple game if furthermore this family is monotonic.
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3. DOMINANCE OF A GBC
In this section we will first give classical properties of a preference aggregation rule.
After the definition of the dominance of a GBC ∆, we will study the relationship be-
tween properties of the distribution of power ∆ and properties of F∆, the preference
aggregation rule associated to ∆.
DEFINITION 5. A Preference aggregation rule (PAR) is a mapping F from
CN to B.
a) F satisﬁes the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) if:
∀RN , QN ∈ CN ,∀(x, y) ∈ A, RN{x, y} = QN{x, y} ⇒
[
xF (RN)y ⇔ xF (QN)y
]
.
b) F is decisive if:
∀RN , QN ∈ CN ,∀(x, y) ∈ A, N(x, y, RN) = N(x, y,QN)⇒
[
xF (RN)y ⇔ xF (QN)y
]
.
c) F is monotonic if:
∀RN , QN ∈ CN ,∀(x, y) ∈ A, RN(x, y) ⊆ QN(x, y)⇒
[
xF (RN)y ⇒ xF (QN)y
]
.
d) F is neutral if:
∀RN , QN ∈ CN ,∀x, y, a, b ∈ A, RN{x, y} = QN{a, b} ⇒
[
xF (RN)y ⇔ aF (QN)b
]
.
Let us remark that if F is decisive, monotonic or neutral, then F satisfies IIA.
DEFINITION 6. Let ∆ be a GBC, RN ∈ CN and (x, y) ∈ A.
i) x dominates y in (∆, RN) , denoted xd∆(R
N)y, if π(x, y, RN) ∈ ∆(x, y).
ii) The preference aggregation rule of ∆, called also the dominance of ∆, is
the PAR, denoted F∆, deﬁned by:
∀RN ∈ CN , (x, y) ∈ A, xF∆(R
N)y ⇔ xd∆(R
N)y.
When the PAR F∆ of a GBC ∆ satisfies some properties, for instance, when
F∆(R
N) is always an acyclic relation, we will also say that the dominance of ∆ is,
for instance acyclic.
Let us first characterize PAR’s which are dominances of GBC’s.
THEOREM 1. Let F be a PAR. F is a dominance of a GBC if and only if F satisﬁes
IIA.
Proof. i) Let F∆ be the PAR of ∆, R
N and QN ∈ CN , and (x, y) ∈ A, which satisfy
RN{x, y} = QN{x, y}.
RN{x, y} = QN{x, y} implies π(x, y, RN) = π(x, y,QN). Consequently π(x, y, RN)∈
∆(x, y) ⇔ π(x, y,QN) ∈ ∆(x, y). By the definition of F∆ we obtain xF∆(Q
N)y if
and only if xF∆(R
N)y and F∆ is IIA.
ii) Conversely, let F be a PAR which satisfies IIA. We define ∆0 as follows:
∀(x, y) ∈ A,∀(S, T ) ∈ N , (S, T ) ∈ ∆0(x, y) ⇔ ∃R
N ∈ CN , xF (RN)y, (S, T ) =
π(x, y, RN). It is easy to prove that: F = F∆0 .
The equivalence between the preference aggregation rule of a GBC and a pref-
erence aggregation rule which satisfies IIA is one of the major achievements of the
notion of GBC which can therefore be used as an unified notion for Arrovian results.
Let us deduce the following more classic characterizations of particular PAR’s:
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COROLLARY 1. a) F is a PAR of a decisive GBC if and only if F is decisive.
b) F is a PAR of a neutral GBC if and only if F is neutral.
c) F is the PAR of a voting game if and only if F is decisive and neutral.
d) F is the PAR of a simple game if and only if F is decisive, neutral and
monotonic.
Moreover one has the following obvious result:
PROPOSITION 1. Let ∆ be a GBC.
i) ∀RN ∈ CN , F∆(R
N) is complete on A⇐⇒ ∆ is complete.
ii) ∀RN ∈ CN , F∆(R
N) is asymmetric on A⇐⇒ ∆ is asymmetric.
remark 1. Let ∆ be a GBC and ∆∗ , the asymmetric component of ∆ be defined
as follows: ∀(x, y) ∈ A, ∀(S, T ) ∈ N , (S, T ) ∈ ∆∗(x, y) ⇐⇒ (S, T ) ∈ ∆(x, y)
and T = N − S. We can notice that ∆ and ∆∗ can have very different power
distributions. For example, let us consider that ∆ is the simple majority GBC as
quoted in the introduction. Then coalitions have relative power of decision, but ∆∗ is
the strict majority simple game with coalitions which are decisive. When individual
preferences are complete and asymmetric, it is easy to prove the following important
relation between ∆ and ∆∗ : ∀RN ∈ HN , F∆(R
N) = F∆∗(RN ).
3.1. transitivity
One of the most usual properties of a preference aggregation rule F is to associate
with each profile of individual preferences, a collective relation which is transitive.
Let us characterize such a rule when F is a PAR of a GBC (i.e. when F satisfies
IIA) for various domains.
LEMMA 1. Let RN be a proﬁle of weak orders on x, y, z, (S0, S1) = π(x, y, R
N), (T0, T1) =
π(y, z, RN) and (U0, U1) = π(x, z, R
N).
then


S0 ∩ T0 ⊆ U0 ⊆ S0 ∪ T0
S1 ∩ T1 ⊆ U1 ⊆ S1 ∪ T1
S0\(U0 ∪ U1) = T1\(U0 ∪ U1)
T0\(U0 ∪ U1) = S1\(U0 ∪ U1)
Proof. Left to the reader:
THEOREM 2. Let ∆ be a GBC with |A| ≥ 3. The following assertions are equiva-
lent:
i) ∀RN ∈ WN , F∆(R
N) is transitive on A.
ii) ∀x, y, z ⊂ A,∀(S0, S1), (T0, T1), (U0, U1) ∈ N
(α)


(S0, S1) ∈ ∆(x, y)
(T0, T1) ∈ ∆(y, z)
S0 ∩ T0 ⊆ U0 ⊆ S0 ∪ T0
S1 ∩ T1 ⊆ U1 ⊆ S1 ∪ T1
S0\(U0 ∪ U1) = T1\(U0 ∪ U1)
T0\(U0 ∪ U1) = S1\(U0 ∪ U1)
=⇒ (U0, U1) ∈ ∆(x, z).
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Proof.
i) =⇒ ii) Let x, y, z ⊂ A, (S0, S1), (T0, T1) and (U0, U1) ∈ N and satisfying condi-
tions (α). It is sufficient to show that there exists a profile RN such that (S0, S1) =
π(x, y, RN), (T0, T1) = π(y, z, R
N) and (U0, U1) = π(x, z, R
N). Indeed, since (S0, S1) ∈
∆(x, y) and (T0, T1) ∈ ∆(y, z), then xF∆(R
N)y and yF∆(R
N)z. So, since F∆(R
N) is
transitive on A, xF∆(R
N)z which implies (by IIA) that (U0, U1) ∈ ∆(x, z). Observe
that it is also sufficient to define the restriction of such a profile on x, y, z.
Using (α), one can check that N is partitioned into at most 13 subsets given
below. We assign one of the 13 possible weak orders on {x, y, z} to every voter in
one of these 13 subsets as follows:
[We will use the following notations: R = xyx if xPyPz;R = (xy)z if xIyPz
and R = (xyz) if xIyI].
If i ∈ S0 ∩ U0 ∩ T0, R
i = xyz If i ∈ S0 ∩ U0 ∩ T1, R
i = xzy
If i ∈ S0 ∩ U0 ∩ T
c
0 ∩ T
c
1 , R
i = x(yz) If i ∈ S0 ∩ U1 ∩ T1, R
i = zxy
If i ∈ S0\(U0 ∪ U1), R
i = (xz)y
If i ∈ S1 ∩ U1 ∩ T1, R
i = zyx If i ∈ S1 ∩ U1 ∩ T0, R
i = yzx
If i ∈ S1 ∩ U1 ∩ T
c
0 ∩ T
c
1 , R
i = (yz)x If i ∈ S1 ∩ U0 ∩ T0, R
i = yxz
If i ∈ S1\(U0 ∪ U1), R
i = y(xz)
If i ∈ T0\(S0 ∪ S1), R
i = (xy)z If i ∈ T1\(S0 ∪ S1), R
i = z(xy)
If i /∈ S0cupS1 ∪ T0 ∪ T1, R
i = (xyz)
We have defined the restriction of RN on x, y, z and it is easy to check that it
satisfies the required conditions.
ii) =⇒ i) Conversely let RN ∈ WN such that xF∆(R
N)y and yF∆(R
N)z. Let us
prove that xF∆(R
N)z.
Let us denote by :

(S0, S1) = π(x, y, R
N
(T0, T1) = π(y, z, R
N
(U0, U1) = π(x, z, R
N
(S0, S1), (T0, T1) and (U0, U1) are inN and by Lemma 1 satisfy (α). But xF∆(R
N)y
and yF∆(R
N)z, then (S0, S1) ∈ ∆(x, y) and (T0, T1) ∈ ∆(y, z) and by ii), we obtain
(U0, U1) ∈ ∆(x, z) and thus xF∆(R
N)z, since (U0, U1) = π(x, z, R
N).
We deduce the following result for linear orders:
COROLLARY 2. Let ∆ be a GBC with |A| ≥ 3. The following assertions are
equivalent:
i) ∀RN ∈ LN , F∆(R
N) is transitive on A.
ii) ∀x, y, z ⊂ A,∀(S0, S1), (T0, T1), (U0, U1) ∈ N

(S0, S1 ∈ ∆(x, y)
(T0, T1 ∈ ∆(y, z)
S0 ∩ T0 ⊆ U0 ⊆ S0 ∪ T0
=⇒ (U0, U1) ∈ ∆(x, z)
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remark 2. a) The previous theorem is equivalent to the following which is due to
Ferejohn and Fishburn [1979]:
Let ∆ be a BC (i.e. an asymmetric GBC) with |A| ≥ 3. The following assertions
are equivalent:
i) ∀RN ∈ W∗ N , F∆(R
N) is a strict partial order on A.
ii) ∀x, y, z ⊂ A,∀(S0, S1), (T0, T1), (U0, U1) ∈ N
(β)


(S0, S1) ∈ ∆(x, y)
(T0, T1) ∈ ∆(y, z)
U0 = K0 ∪ [(S0 ∪ T0)− (S1 ∪ T1)]
U1 = K1 ∪ [(S1 ∪ T1)− (S0 ∪ T0)]
K0 ∩K1 = ∅, K0 ⊆ (S0 ∩ T1) ∪ (S1 ∩ T0)
K1 ⊆ (S0 ∩ T1) ∪ (S1 ∩ T0)
=⇒ (U0, U1) ∈ ∆(x, z).
Indeed it is easy to check that conditions (α) and (β) are equivalent. Moreover,
by Proposition 1 ii), F∆(R
N) is always asymmetric if and only if ∆ is a BC.
This result is also obtained by Aleskerov and Vladimirov [1986] using the frame-
work of binary choice rules.
b) When ∆ is a GBC which is decisive and |A| ≥ 3, the following assertions are
equivalent:
i) ∀RN ∈ WN , F∆(R
N) is transitive on A.
ii) ∀{x, y, z} ⊂ A,∀(S0, S1), (T0, T1), (U0, U1) ∈ N

(S0, S1) ∈ ∆(x, y)
(T0, T1) ∈ ∆(y, z)
S0 ∩ T0 ⊆ U0 ⊆ S0 ∪ T0
=⇒ (U0, U1) ∈ ∆(x, z).
Therefore the notion of decisive GBC gives, for profiles of weak orders, a condi-
tion of transitivity which is the same as the one obtained for profiles of linear orders
but for general GBC.
remark 3. Let ∆ be a voting game (i.e. a decisive and neutral GBC), and U be
the family of (decisive) coalitions of N which satisfies ∀{x, y} ⊂ A,∆(x, y) = U . We
can deduce the following properties of the preference aggregation rule of ∆ from the
preceding results and definitions :
1) ∆ is Paretian ⇔ N ∈ U .
2) ∀RN ∈ WN , F∆(R
N) is complete ⇔ [∀S, T ⊆ N,S ∩ T = ∅ ⇒ S ∈ U or T ∈ U ].
3) ∀RN ∈ LN , F∆(R
N) is complete ⇔ [∀S ⊆ N,S /∈ U ⇒ Sc ∈ U ].
4) ∀RN ∈ LN (or WN), F∆(R
N) is transitive
⇔ [∀S, T, U ⊆ N,S ∈ U , T ∈ U and S ∩ T ⊆ U ⊆ S ∪ T ⇒ U ∈ U ].
We can also obtain the following results:
5) If ∀RN ∈ LN (or WN), F∆(R
N) is transitive, then [∀S, T,⊆ N,S ∈ U , T ∈ U ⇒
S ∩ T ∈ U ].
6) If ∆ is Paretian and ∀RN ∈ LN (or WN), F∆(R
N) is transitive, then ∆ is mono-
tonic.
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Using the classic notions of prefilters, filters and ultrafilters one can thus obtain
the Arrovian results on neutral PAR’s for profiles of weak orders or profiles of linear
orders (see [Monjardet, 2003] for such results).
3.2. acyclicity
For the characterization of GBC’s with acyclic dominance we need the following
notions:
DEFINITION 7. Let ∆ be a GBC.
a) C = ({a1, a2, · · · , am}; (Sk, Tk)k=1,···,m) is an AM-cycle of order m of ∆ if:

1) ∀k = 1, · · · ,m, (Sk, Tk) ∈ ∆ (ak, ak+1) with am+1 = a1
2)
m⋂
k=1
Kk 6= ∅ =⇒ ∀k = 1, · · · ,m,Kk = Ik
3)
m⋂
k=1
Lk 6= ∅ =⇒ ∀k = 1, · · · ,m, Lk = Ik
where ∀k = 1, · · · ,m, Ik = N\(Sk ∪ Tk), Kk ∈ {Sk, Ik} and Lk ∈ {Tk, Ik}.
b) C = ({a1, a2, · · · , am}; (Sk, Tk)k=1,···,m) is a FF-cycle of order m of ∆ if:

1) ∀k = 1, · · · ,m, (Sk, Tk) ∈ ∆(ak, ak+1) and am+1 = a1
2) ∀k = 1, · · · ,m, Sk ⊆
m⋃
j=1,j 6=k
Tj
3) ∀k = 1, · · · ,m, Tk ⊆
m⋃
j=1,j 6=k
Sj
c) C = ({a1, a2, · · · , am}; (Sk)k=1,...,m) is an asymmetric cycle (or a-cycle) of order
m of ∆ if:

1) ∀k = 1, · · · ,m, (Sk, S
c
k) ∈ ∆(ak, ak+1) with am+1 = a1
2)
m⋂
k=1
Sk = ∅ and
m⋂
k=1
Sck = ∅ where S
c
k is the complementary of Sk in N
d) C = ({a1, a2, · · · , am}; (Sk)k=1,...,m) is a decisive cycle (or d-cycle) of order m of
∆ if:

1) ∀k = 1, · · · ,m, ∃Tk ⊆ N, (Sk, Tk) ∈ ∆(ak, ak+1) with am+1 = a1
2)
m⋂
k=1
Sk = ∅
We can notice that an a-cycle is a FF-cycle and an AM-cycle. Furthermore, we
have the following result (the proof is left to the reader):
LEMMA 2. Let ∆ be a GBC with |A| ≥ 2. ∆ has a FF-cycle if and only if ∆ has
an AM-cycle.
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The characterization of GBC’s with acyclic dominance is given in the following
Theorem 3. Let us recall that this theorem is due to Ferejohn and Fishburn [1979]
with the minor difference that they use strict weak orders instead of weak orders as
individual preferences. We will give a proof of this theorem, since the above notion
of AM-cycle allows to shorten Ferejohn and Fishburn’s proof. We will also use the
two following lemmas:
LEMMA 3. Let R be a strongly complete binary relation, P the asymmetric compo-
nent of R and I the symmetric component of R.
R is a weak order if and only if every cycle of R is a cycle of I.
Proof. Left to the reader:
LEMMA 4. Let R be binary relation, P the asymmetric component of R and I the
symmetric component of R.
There exists a weak order Q on A such that R ⊆ Q if and only if every cycle of
R is a cycle of I.
Proof. The necessary condition is an obvious consequence of Lemma 3.
Assume that R = P + I is such that every cycle of R is a cycle of his symmetric
component I. Say that an element x of A is R-maximal if for every y ∈ A, yRx
implies xRy. We denote by MaxRA the set of R-maximal elements of A. Observe
that due to the property of R this set is not empty, and that this property is
hereditary. Then we can consider the partition (Cj)j≤t of A defined by:
Cj =MaxRAj, with A0 = A,Aj = A−
j−1⋃
h=0
Ch and Ct+1 = ∅.
To this partition is (canonically) associated the weak order Q on A defined by:
∀x, y ∈ A, xQy ⇔ x ∈ Ci, y ∈ Cj and i ≤ j.
Now, by construction, xRy implies xQy, and so Q is a weak order containing R.
THEOREM 3. Let ∆ be a GBC with |A| ≥ 2.
∀RN ∈ WN , F∆(R
N) is acyclic on A ⇔ ∆ has no FF-cycle.
Proof. By Lemma 2 we can prove this theorem by proving that the following asser-
tions are equivalent:
i) ∃RN ∈ WN such that F∆(R
N) has a cycle
ii) ∆ has an AM-cycle.
i) ⇒ ii) Let RN ∈ WN , such that F∆(R
N) contains a cycle. Then there exists
{a1, a2, · · · , am} such that for each k ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m}, akF∆(R
N)ak+1 where am+1 =
a1. Let Sk = N(ak, ak+1, R
N) and Tk = N(ak+1, ak, R
N) and Ik = N − (Sk ⌣ Tk) =
{i ∈ N/akI
iak+1}.
Then C = ({a1, a2, · · · , am}; (Sk, Tk)k=1,...,m) is an AM-cycle. Indeed, first since
for each k ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}, akF∆(R
N)ak+1, (Sk, Tk) ∈ ∆(ak, ak+1). Now, assume that,
for example, there exists i ∈
m⋂
k=1
Kk. Then the weak order R
i = P i + I i contains
a cycle. By Lemma 3 this cycle must be a cycle of I i, so Kk = Ik for each k ∈
{1, 2, ...,m}.
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ii) ⇒i) Let C = ({a1, a2, · · · , am}; (Sk, Tk)k=1,...,m) be an AM-cycle of order m of
∆. Let us define for each i ∈ N ,
M+i = {k = 1, · · · ,m/i ∈ Sk},M
−
i = {k = 1, · · · ,m/i ∈ Tk} and M
0
i = {k =
1, ...,m/i ∈ Ik}.
We define a relation M i on B = {a1, a2, · · · , am} by:
M i = {(ak, ak+1), k ∈M
+
i }∪{ak+1, ak), k ∈M
−
i }∪{ak, ak+1), (ak+1, ak), k ∈M
0
i }
By construction M i is a relation on B such that every cycle of M i is a cycle
of his symmetric component. So by Lemma 4 there exists a weak order Qi on B
containing M i.
Let us define for each i ∈N a relation Ri on A by:
∀x, y ∈ B, xRiy ⇐⇒ xQiy
∀x ∈ B,∀y /∈ B, xRiy
∀x /∈ B,∀y /∈ B, xRiy and yRix
Ri is a weak order onA such that Sk = N(ak, ak+1, R
N) and Tk = N(ak+1, ak, R
N) for
each k ∈ {1, · · · ,m}, then (by Definition 6 i)) for each k ∈ {1, · · · ,m} akF∆(R
N)ak+1
and therefore F∆(R
N) contains a cycle.
COROLLARY 3. a) Let ∆ be a GBC with |A| ≥ 2.
∀RN ∈ LN , F∆(R
N) is acyclic on A⇔ ∆ has no a-cycle.
b) Let ∆ be a decisive GBC with |A| ≥ 2.
∀RN ∈ LN (or WN), F∆(R
N) is acyclic on A⇔ ∆ has no d-cycle.
Remark 4. If ∆ has no FF-cycle of order 2, then ∆ is asymmetric, the hypothesis
of asymmetry is therefore redundant in Ferejohn and Fishburn [1979] for their result
on acyclicity.
When ∆ is a neutral GBC, pairs of coalitions are independent from pairs of
alternatives. We will therefore define the notions of neutral AM-cycle, neutral FF-
cycle, neutral a-cycle and neutral d-cycle by deleting any reference to alternatives.
We will, for example, obtain the following definition of neutral AM-cycle of order
m of a neutral GBC ∆ such that: ∀{x, y} ⊂ A,∆(x, y) = U .
DEFINITION 8. C = ((Sk, Tk)k=1,···,m) is a neutral AM-cycle of order m of ∆ if:

1) ∀k = 1, · · · ,m, (Sk, Tk) ∈ U
2)
m⋂
k=1
Kk 6= ∅ =⇒ ∀k = 1, · · · ,m,Kk = Ck
3)
m⋂
k=1
 Lk 6= ∅ =⇒ ∀k = 1, · · · ,m, Lk= Ck
where ∀k = 1, · · · ,m,Ck = N\(Sk ∪ Tk), Kk ∈ {Sk, Ck} and Lk ∈ {Tk, Ck}
Furthermore let us define, for a neutral GBC ∆, the following numbers which
are generalizations of the Nakamura’s number for simple games:
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DEFINITION 9. Let ∆ be a GBC.
a) ν1(∆) =
{
+∞ if ∆ has no AM − cycle
min{m/∆ has an AM − cycle of order m} if ∆ has an AM − cycle
b) ν2(∆) =
{
+∞ if ∆ has no a− cycle
minm/∆ has no a− cycle if ∆ has an a− cycle
c) ν3(∆) =
{
+∞ if ∆ has no d− cycle
minm/∆ has no d− cycle if ∆ has a d− cycle
The results on acyclicity of neutral BGC are therefore the following:
COROLLARY 4. 1) Let ∆ be a neutral GBC with |A| ≥ 2.
∀RN ∈ WN (or W∗N), F∆(R
N) is acyclic on A ⇔ ν1(∆) > |A| .
2) Let ∆ be a neutral GBC with |A| ≥ 2.
∀RN ∈ LN , F∆(R
N) is acyclic on A⇔ ν2(∆) > |A|.
3) Let ∆ be a voting game with |A| ≥ 2.
∀RN ∈ WN , F∆(R
N) is acyclic on A⇔ ν3(∆) > |A|.
remark 5. The above results on acyclic GBC’s have been the basis of several
classic results on vetoers. A player k is called a vetoer for a PAR F if for each
profile RN , xP ky implies that not (yF (RN)x). Le Breton and Truchon [1995] deduce,
from the previous Ferejohn and Fishburn’s theorem, the results of Blair and Pollak
[1982] and Kelsey [1985]) on the existence of players and coalitions who have veto
power over alternatives. They also give a precise answer to the problems of the
minimum size of the coalitions that must have a veto power under any acyclic
preference aggregation rule and of the minimum number of pairs of alternatives
on which these coalitions may exercise their power. From the same theorem of
Ferejohn and Fishburn, Banks [1995] extends many results such as Sen’s [1970]
liberal paradox, Blau and Deb’s [1977] theorem on the existence of vetoers and
Brown’s [1975] theorem on the non-emptiness of a collegium.
4. CORE-STABILITY OF A GBC
Let us start this section on the study of core-stability of a GBC by the definition
of the notion of a core of a GBC, notion which generalizes the notions of core of
a decisive GBC [Andjiga and Moulen, 1989] and [Truchon, 1995], core of a voting
game [Andjiga and Mbih, 2000] and core of a simple game [Nakamura, 1979].
DEFINITION 10. Let ∆ be a GBC, RN ∈ BN and GN ⊆ BN .
i) An alternative x is undominated in (∆, RN) if ∀y ∈ A, y 6= x, (y, x) /∈
d∆(R
N).
i) The core of ∆ in RN , denoted C(∆, RN), is the set of undominated alternatives
in (∆, RN).
ii) ∆ is G-core-stable if : ∀RN ∈ GN , C(∆, RN) 6= ∅.
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The study of core-stable GBC’s will need the following notions :
DEFINITION 11. Let ∆ be a GBC.
a) Γ = ((Sk, Tk, (xk, yk))k=1,···,m is a strong AM-cycle of order m of ∆ if :
1) ∀k = 1, · · · ,m, (Sk, Tk) ∈ ∆(xk, yk),
2)
m⋃
k=1
{yk} = A,
3) ∀{k1, k2, · · · , kp} ⊂ {1, 2, ...,m}/xkj+1 = ykj ∀j = 1, · · · , p where xkp+1 = xk1
3.1)
p⋂
j=1
Kkj 6= ∅ =⇒ ∀j = 1, · · · , p,Kkj = Ikj
3.2)
p⋂
j=1
Lkj 6= ∅ =⇒ ∀j = 1, · · · , p, Lkj = Ikj
where ∀j = 1, ..., p, Ikj = N\(Skj ∪ Tkj), Kkj ∈
{
Skj ,Ikj
}
and Lkj ∈
{
Tkj ,Ikj
}
.
b) Γ = ((Sk, (xk, yk))k=1,···,m is a strong a-cycle of order m of ∆ if:
1) ∀k = 1, · · · ,m, (Sk, S
c
k) ∈ ∆(xk, yk),
2)
m⋃
k=1
{yk} = A,
3) ∀{k1, k2, · · · , kp} ⊂ {1, 2, · · · ,m}/xkj+1 = ykj, ∀j = 1, · · · , p where xkp+1 = xk1
p⋂
j=1
Skj = ∅ and
p⋂
j=1
Sk
c
j = ∅
c) Γ = ((Sk), (xk, yk))k=1,···,m is a strong d-cycle of order m of ∆ if:
1) ∀k = 1, · · · ,m, ∃Tk ⊂ N, (Sk, Tk) ∈ ∆(xk, yk),
2)
m⋃
k=1
{yk} = A,
3) If there exists a subset {k1, k2, · · · , kp} of {1, 2, · · · ,m} such that xkj+1 =
ykj∀j=1,...,p where xkp+1 = xk1, then
p⋂
j=1
Skj = ∅.
Let us give the relation between the previous notions and the notions of cycles
of a GBC :
PROPOSITION 2. Let ∆ be a GBC.
a) If Γ is a strong AM-cycle of ∆ of order m, then there exists an AM-cycle of order
p of ∆ with p ≤ m.
b) If Γ is a strong a-cycle of ∆ of order m, then there exists an a-cycle of order p
of ∆ with p ≤ m.
c) If Γ is a strong d-cycle of ∆ of order m, then there exists a d-cycle of order p of
∆ with p ≤ m.
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By a slight modification of the proof of the previous Ferejohn and Fishburn
theorem, we obtain the following result:
THEOREM 4. Let ∆ be a GBC with |A| ≥ 2.
∆ is W-core-stable ⇔ ∆ has no strong AM-cycle.
We deduce the following results on the core-stability of particular GBC’s in
particular domains of individual preferences :
COROLLARY 5. Let ∆ be a GBC. with |A| ≥ 2.
i) ∆ is L-core-stable ⇔ ∆ has no strong a-cycle.
ii) If ∆ is a decisive GBC with |A| ≥ 2, then
∆ is L-core-stable ⇔ ∆ is W-core-stable ⇔ ∆ has no strong a-cycle.
iii) If ∆ is neutral GBC with |A| ≥ 2, then
∆ is W-core-stable ⇔ ν1(∆) > |A|.
∆ is L-core-stable ⇔ ν2(∆) > |A|.
iv) If ∆ is a voting game with |A| ≥ 2, then
∆ is W-core-stable ⇔ ν3(∆) > |A|.
v) If ∆ is a simple game with |A| ≥ 2, then
∆ is L-core-stable ⇔ ∆ is W-core-stable ⇔ ν3(∆) > |A|.
vi) If ∆ is Paretian GBC with |A| ≥ 2, then
∆ is L-core-stable ⇔ ∀RN ∈ LN , F∆(R
N) is acyclic on A
∆ is W-core-stable ⇔ ∀RN ∈ WN , F∆(R
N) is acyclic on A.
The above corollaries are due respectively to Andjiga and Moulen [1989]; Truchon
[1995] for ii); Andjiga and Mbih [2001] for iv); Andjiga and Mbih [2000]) for v) and
Nakamura [1979] for vi).
Let us finally notice that if ∆ is a simple game, ν3(∆) is the Nakamura’s number.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
1) Section 1 of this paper can be seen as a continuity of the study done by Ferejohn
and Fishburn [1979] when the individual preferences are strict weak orders to the
case where they are weak orders or linear orders. As in Le Breton and Truchon [1995]
or in Truchon [1996], the results on the acyclicity of the preference aggregation rule
of a GBC can therefore also be used to obtain (classic and new) results on vetoers
and oligarchies.
2) The equivalence between the dominance of GBC’s and PAR’s which satisfy IIA
is one of the major achievements of the Ferejohn and Fishburn paper. This gives
us a tool to unify the results obtained on various domains. For example, one good
exercise is to deduce versions of Arrow’s Theorem (with various types of dictators) as
corollaries of the results of Section 1 on transitive and complete dominance of GBC’s
or to obtain new results on this area. For example, in Andjiga and Moulen [2003]
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we obtain a characterization of lexicographic dictatorship (result also obtained in
Hild [2001] and Fishburn [1974]).
3) Section 2 gives a unified study of cores defined on main distributions of power:
GBC’s, binary constitutions, voting games and simple games. It is obvious that non
binary decisive structures as effectivity functions [Keiding, 1985], constitutions and
generalized constitutions [Moulen, Andjiga and Brissaud, 1999] are not concerned
with the present study. Let us notice that the Keiding’s [1985] theorem on core-
stability of effectivity functions, which is a corollary of Andjiga and Moulen’s [1988]
result on core-stability of constitutions, is a generalization of the Nakamura’s [1979]
theorem on core-stability of simple games.
4) In recent papers Felsenthal and Machover [1987, 2001] emphasize on the fact that
some real-life decision rules, in particular UN security council and US legislature, are
misrepresented as simple games and they define the notion of ternary voting games
to model these situations. Let us notice that these decision rules can be (also) seen
as neutral GBC’s. The UN security council can be modelled as the neutral GBC
∆ defined by: (S,T) is a majority for ∆ if and only if S has strictly more than 8
members and T has no permanent member.
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